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BETWEEN THE OLD METAPHYSICS AND THE NEW EMPIRICISM: 
COLLINGWOOD’S DEFENCE OF THE AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY 
Giuseppina D’Oro 
 
Abstract 
Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth 
century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist 
committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, 
or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of 
philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood’s key philosophical works are a 
sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline 
with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood’s attempt to defend the 
autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional 
notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 
1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the 
idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neo-
empiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid-century by 
defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood’s work is a sustained attempt to 
articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since 
there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is 
no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a 
scientifically informed ontology. 
 
The analytic tradition is often seen as arising out of the ashes of a form of Hegelian 
metaphysics that was revived by British idealists such as Bradley.
1
 It has become 
customary to read the history of the rise of analytic philosophy as the story of the 
gradual erosion of the a priori, a process which begun with Ayer’s2 and the early 
Carnap’s3 attack on metaphysics and culminated in Quine’s4 dismissal of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.
5
 This genetic story about how analytic philosophy 
originated does not necessarily tell us much about the essential character of analytic 
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Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Candlish, S., The Russell/Bradley 
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 Carnap, R., ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’, Erkenntnis, 
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philosophy today, if indeed there is any such character. From David Lewis to 
Jonathan Lowe, the latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a return of 
substantive metaphysics that would be anathema to the earlier generation of analytic 
philosophers.
6
 Yet, with all the faults and imperfections that cling to grand narratives, 
the genetic story does nonetheless identify a certain philosophical trend in which the 
rise of the analytic tradition coincides with the increasing popularity of naturalism and 
the progressive erosion of a conception of philosophy as ‘first science’. 
How does Collingwood fit into the story of the rise of analytic philosophy? 
Not much has been written about Collingwood’s intervention in the history of 
twentieth century philosophy, either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old 
idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave 
behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of 
philosophy into history. 
 This paper reassesses Collingwood’s intervention in the history of twentieth 
century philosophy by taking a close look first, at the philosophical tête-à-tête with 
(the early) Ryle which took place in the aftermath of the publication of An Essay on 
Philosophical Method,
7
 and then at his attack on Ayer in An Essay on Metaphysics.
8
 I 
argue, firstly, that Collingwood’s key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to 
defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method 
and subject matter and, secondly, that his attempt to defend the autonomy of 
philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the 
kind of scepticism about meaning which came to prevail from the early 1920s and 
which found full expression in Quine. Collingwood saw the attempt to eliminate 
intensional notions along with traditional metaphysics as a case of throwing out the 
semantic baby together with the ontological bathwater. Both in An Essay on 
Philosophical Method and in An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood was arguing 
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 3 
against that philosophical trend which, from the moderate empiricism of Ayer to the 
radical empiricism of Quine, is often identified with the narrative of the rise of 
analytic philosophy. That might well be the reason why, in spite of having made one 
of the most significant contributions to meta-philosophy in the twentieth century, 
Collingwood has not become part of the philosophical canon: his message was not 
sufficiently world-historical. 
 
The Essay on Philosophical Method and the correspondence with Ryle 
The correspondence between Collingwood and Ryle was prompted by an article in 
Mind
9
 where Ryle had presented a vitriolic critique of Collingwood’s defence of the 
ontological argument in chapter IV of An Essay on Philosophical Method. Here 
Collingwood claims that the ontological proof applies in one case only, namely to the 
objects of philosophical thought or, as he puts it in a private letter to Ryle, to ‘that 
which we are thinking about when we are thinking philosophically’.10 Collingwood 
claims that when it is properly understood as applying to the objects of philosophical 
thought, the ontological proof will be viable, even if in a revised form: 
 
My own view of the Ontological proof is that there is “something in it” as 
we say... but that its defect, in its traditional form, is that this something is 
often left vague, and that the term God (as anyone might indeed guess, 
who is familiar with the general drift of neo-Platonic and early medieval 
thought) has to be taken as standing for “that which we are thinking about 
when we are thinking philosophically”. When this matter is made clear, it 
is to me also clear that the traditional ontological proof will have to be 
revised to bring it, so to speak, up to date; and this is what I have tried to 
do...
11
  
 
In this revised form, the ontological proof applies not to God but to philosophical 
propositions, propositions which, according to Collingwood, define the domain of 
                                                 
9
 Ryle, G., ‘Mr Collingwood and the Ontological Argument’, Mind, 44 (1935), pp. 137-51. 
10
 Collingwood’s letter to Ryle dated 9 May 1935, in Collingwood, An Essay on 
Philosophical Method, 2005, p. 257. 
11
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 4 
enquiry of first order sciences. ‘Mind exists’ and ‘Matter exists’ are paradigmatic 
examples.  
But in what precise sense do the propositions ‘Mind exists’ and ‘Matter exists’ 
exemplify the structure of the ontological argument? Philosophical propositions may 
be said to exemplify the structure of the ontological proof because, like the 
proposition ‘God exists’, they are both a priori and ampliative. They are a priori 
because they can be known by reflecting on the explanatory practices of the first-
order sciences. They are ampliative (and therefore synthetic) because they make 
explicit something that is implicitly known by the practitioners of those sciences. The 
specific sense in which philosophical propositions are ampliative is captured by 
Collingwood’s claim that philosophy 
 
… does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of 
which we were simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way 
things which we already knew in some way… 12  
 
Because philosophical analysis makes explicit the conceptions of the real with which 
historians and natural scientists implicitly work, the results of philosophical enquiry 
can never be genuinely surprising for they are presupposed by the very conception of 
reality which they strive to clarify. But because philosophical knowledge engenders a 
certain kind of self-knowledge or self-understanding, philosophical propositions are 
not analytic in a narrow sense. 
It is clear from Collingwood’s conception of philosophical analysis that 
philosophical propositions like ‘Mind exists’ or ‘Matter exists’ do not exemplify the 
structure of the ontological argument if such an argument is meant to establish 
synthetic truths, where by synthetic one means extra-conceptual. Philosophical 
propositions are not ampliative in the sense that they predicate either mentality or 
materiality of some extra-linguistic entity which lies outside the domain of enquiry of 
the sciences of nature and mind. They are ampliative (and thus synthetic) only in the 
much more modest sense that they clarify what the domains of enquiry of different 
sciences are, what exists for the historian, and for the natural scientist. Whilst they 
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 5 
may be called, as indeed Collingwood does on one occasion, ‘synthetic a priori’,13 
they are ultimately conceptual claims which clarify the conception of reality at work 
in the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften. For that is precisely what 
philosophical propositions are: second-order propositions which define the domain of 
enquiry of the first order disciplines.  
Yet even in this revised form, Collingwood’s attempted rehabilitation of the 
ontological argument failed to persuade Ryle who replied to Collingwood both in a 
number of private letters
14
 and publicly in a further article in Mind.
15
 In spite of 
Collingwood’s clarification of the precise sense in which philosophical propositions 
may be said to exemplify the structure of the ontological argument, Ryle remained 
unsatisfied. There are, Ryle claims, only two kinds of propositions, propositions 
which are genuinely necessary and universal but are also merely hypothetical and 
have no existential import, and propositions which are contingent and have existential 
import, but which lack genuine universality. The former are what Hume referred to as 
propositions about relations of ideas, propositions such as ‘all bachelors are unmarried 
men’, and the latter are enumerative propositions about matters of fact, such as ‘all 
men in the room are bachelors’. The proposition ‘Mind exists’ cannot be a relation of 
ideas, for it makes an existential claim and is thus not hypothetical. So if it is not an 
illicit metaphysical proposition, it must be rephrased as an enumerative proposition 
about matters of fact stating: ‘x1 is minded, x2 is minded, x3 is minded etc’. 
Understood in this way, the proposition ‘Mind exists’ has existential import, but is 
also contingent rather than necessary. Ryle did not explicitly say so, but he could have 
said that the proposition ‘Mind exists’ is merely one amongst a series of 
‘systematically misleading expressions’ in which the grammatical form of the 
proposition leads us to postulate the existence of an entity, in this case ‘Mind’, over 
and beyond the particulars or class of objects in which the concept is instantiated.
16
 
Ryle’s response is somewhat surprising because if for Collingwood philosophical 
propositions such as ‘Mind exists’ and ‘Matter exists’ are ampliative purely in the 
sense that they make explicit the conception of reality employed by historians and 
natural scientists, they are still at bottom analytic propositions which express 
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 6 
conceptual truths and which do not subvert the Humean fork. To say that ‘Mind 
exists’ is to say that historians are concerned with what exists qua actions or 
expression of thought and to say that ‘Matter exists’ is to say that natural scientists are 
concerned with what exists as events governed by causal laws. But if philosophical 
propositions are at bottom analytic propositions which do not make problematic extra-
conceptual claims, why did Ryle object to them? 
The Collingwood-Ryle correspondence is illuminating precisely because it 
shows that Ryle’s failure to understand Collingwood’s defence of second-order, meta-
level philosophical propositions, far from being just an expression of irritation 
towards anybody who dared even think of reintroducing talk of the ontological proof, 
was deeply rooted in a genuine disagreement about the nature of concepts. At the root 
of Ryle’s disagreement with Collingwood’s defence of philosophical propositions 
there lies a commitment to an extensionalist account of concepts that effectively 
prevents Ryle from acknowledging the possibility of a leaner, non-metaphysical 
notion of the synthetic a priori. For the sake of clarity I shall refer to the 
(metaphysical) notion of the synthetic a priori with which Ryle operates as synthetic 
a priori1 and the (conceptual) notion with which Collingwood operates as synthetic a 
priori2. For Ryle a judgment is synthetic a priori1 if it is necessary, universal and has 
existential import. For Collingwood a judgment is synthetic a priori2 if it is a second 
order proposition which defines the domain of enquiry of the first order sciences. Like 
propositions concerning relations of ideas, propositions which define the domain of 
enquiry of different sciences are necessary and universal. From the perspective of the 
historian, all actions must be expressions of thought or mind because if something is 
not an expression of thought, then it could not (in virtue of what we mean) be an 
action. That ‘actions are expressions of thought or mind’ is thus not a contingent and 
enumerative proposition about matters of fact, but a necessary and universal 
proposition which captures the domain of enquiry of history or the conception of 
reality with which the historian operates. Synthetic a priori propositions2 are also 
ampliative. But since, as we have seen, what makes philosophical propositions 
ampliative is not that they involve reference to an extra-conceptual element, but that 
they bring to light what we already implicitly know, philosophical propositions are 
ultimately analytic, even if not merely definitional. On the surface, the disagreement 
between Collingwood and Ryle is over whether there are synthetic a priori 
judgments1. Collingwood’s defence of the ontological proof is what prompts Ryle’s 
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 7 
denial that there are any necessary existential judgements, including philosophical 
propositions such as ‘Mind exists’ and ‘Matter exists’. On closer inspection, however, 
the disagreement is about whether there are synthetic a priori judgments2 and the 
bone of contention is not whether it is possible to make ontological claims from the 
philosophical armchair in the manner of classical rationalist metaphysics, but whether 
we are entitled to employ concepts, such as that of mind, which cannot be defined 
extensionally. Whilst Collingwood’s attempt to defend the possibility of a third kind 
of proposition via the ontological proof suggests, as Ryle indeed assumed, that this 
third kind of proposition is both a priori necessary and has existential import, a 
careful reading of the philosophical context in which Collingwood’s rehabilitation of 
the ontological proof is mounted shows that what drives Collingwood’s defence of 
philosophical propositions is not an attempt to vindicate rationalist metaphysics by 
challenging the Humean fork, but an attempt to vindicate the right to use concepts 
which cannot be defined extensionally. 
Collingwood’s conception of the synthetic a priori is best understood in the 
context of his account of the overlap of classes, for it is here that he explains what it is 
that we are thinking about when are thinking philosophically or, in other words, what 
the objects of philosophical thought are to which the ontological proof is said to 
apply. In An Essay on Philosophical Method Collingwood claims that whilst the 
coordinate species of an empirical genus form mutually exclusive classes, the 
coordinate species of a philosophical genus may in principle allow for full extensional 
overlap, and that it is the task of philosophy to distinguish between concepts that co-
exist in their instances.
17
 Consider, for example, the empirical concept “colour” and 
its coordinate species “red” and “blue”. If an object is red all over, it cannot be blue 
all over. Red and blue are thus mutually exclusive empirical classes. The same does 
not apply to the coordinate species of philosophical concepts. To illustrate this claim 
Collingwood considers a distinction often made by moral philosophers between the 
concept of duty and that of utility. This, Collingwood claims, is a distinction to which 
there correspond no well-defined empirical differences. The concept of duty and that 
of utility form overlapping empirical classes because an action performed for 
instrumental considerations could in principle also be performed for duty’s sake. It is 
the task of the philosopher to make the purely intensional distinction between the 
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concept of duty and utility even when such concepts have mutually overlapping 
empirical classes and thus fail to ‘cut nature at the joints’. The distinction between the 
concept of mind and matter, for Collingwood is analogous to the distinction between 
duty and utility. It is, in other words, a purely intensional distinction to which there 
correspond no well defined empirical classes and which is nonetheless required in 
order to avoid conceptual errors of the kind that would arise by conflating the criteria 
of identification for actions and events. 
As the doctrine of the overlap of classes makes clear, Collingwood’s defence of 
philosophical propositions is not motivated by a metaphysical agenda for his goal is 
not to advocate the existence of Mind and Matter as mind-independent metaphysical 
entities, but to drive a wedge between the extension and the intension of concepts. As 
he puts it in the correspondence: 
 
I am disposed to think that what makes a number of things instances of a 
class is the common possession of some nature, and that this common 
nature (the so-called universal) is thus the ratio essendi of the class as 
such. Instead of resolving the theory of universals into the theory of 
classes, I should therefore be inclined to take the opposite line, of 
resolving the theory of classes into the theory of universals...”18 
 
The concepts of Mind and Matter, according to Collingwood are ‘transcendentals’.19 
They are concepts that cannot be justified empirically because they determine the 
meaning of what it is to be. Whilst we may justify the employment of empirical 
concepts, such as those of crystalline or sedimentary rocks, by pointing to their 
instances, we cannot justify in a like manner the concepts of duty and utility, or the 
concepts of mind and matter, for the objects which fall under one of these concepts 
may also fall under the other.
20
 We can get a hold on such concepts, and the 
distinctions that they enable us to make, only if we acknowledge that the intension of 
concepts is not reducible to their extension and that a theory of concepts is not 
                                                 
18
 Collingwood’s letter to Ryle dated 9 May 1935 in Collingwood 2005, p. 292. 
19
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reducible to a theory of classes. And this is precisely the bone of contention between 
Collingwood and (the early) Ryle. 
Whilst Ryle accuses Collingwood of having been misled by the grammatical 
structure of the proposition into believing in the existence of metaphysical entities, 
Collingwood, for his part, believes that the extensionalist account of concepts to 
which Ryle is committed rests upon the fallacy of identified coincidents.
21
 Those who 
commit this fallacy erroneously assume that if two concepts coincide in their 
instances, then there is no distinction in the concepts themselves: 
 
two concepts ‘are the same thing’ in the sense that a thing which 
exemplifies the one exemplifies the other also, but ‘their being is not the 
same’ in the sense that being an instance of the one is not the same as 
being an instance of the other.
22
  
 
Collingwood’s appeal to two senses of the term ‘being’ cannot be accused of violating 
Occam’s razor for his point is not that Mind ‘exists’ in a special Platonic sense, but 
that there is a third way between metaphysics and empiricism, and that such a via 
media is revealed once one acknowledges the distinction between the intension and 
extension of concepts. So why did Ryle resolutely refuse to acknowledge the 
possibility of a third way? On the surface, it would appear that he rejected 
philosophical propositions as illicitly metaphysical because he identified synthetic a 
priori judgments with judgments which are both necessary and existential. But this, as 
I have tried to suggest, cannot be the whole story since Ryle’s repudiation of classical 
rationalist metaphysics only entails a rejection of the synthetic a priori in sense 1, not 
in sense 2. Thus Ryle’s unwillingness to concede the possibility of philosophical 
propositions has as much to do with his identification of a theory of concepts with a 
theory of classes as it has to do with his rejection of classical metaphysics.  
Ryle’s extensionalist account of concepts attempts, in one fell swoop, to 
dispose both of the ontological claims made by classical metaphysicians and of the 
rather more modest conceptual claims advanced by Collingwood, according to which 
philosophical propositions, far from defining Mind or Matter into existence, delineate 
the domains of enquiry of the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. Since 
                                                 
21
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Ryle does not acknowledge the possibility of a leaner, non-metaphysical 
interpretation of the synthetic a priori, he is not only unwilling, but also unable to 
accept Collingwood’s view that there are second-order, meta-level propositions which 
define the distinctive domain of enquiry of philosophy. 
 
An Essay on Metaphysics and the verificationist principle of meaning. 
An Essay on Philosophical Method sought to carve out a distinctive domain of 
enquiry for philosophical analysis by defending intensional notions against the 
extensionalist stance endorsed by the early Ryle. Collingwood argued that there is a 
distinctive domain of enquiry for philosophy because philosophy is concerned with 
the propositions (‘Mind exists’, ‘Matter exists’) which express the conception of 
reality implicitly presupposed by first-order scientists. Yet though such propositions 
are not traditional metaphysical propositions making necessary existential claims in 
the manner of the ontological argument, they are nonetheless ruled out as illicit by 
identifying the theory of concepts with the theory of classes, if not by invoking the 
Humean fork. The extensionalist stance thus threatens not only the possibility of 
metaphysics, but also the very possibility of philosophy, understood as a second-order 
reflection on the first order sciences intent on disambiguating concepts which coexist 
in their instances. If philosophy is to be possible, as an epistemologically first science 
whose role is to define a priori the domain of enquiry of the first order disciplines, 
then there must be at least some concepts which do not cut nature at the joints and 
which elude Ryle’s extensionalist treatment. 
Although Collingwood never replied publicly to Ryle, not even to Ryle’s 
second paper in Mind, he did pursue his defence of the autonomy of philosophy in a 
second treatise on meta-philosophy: An Essay on Metaphysics. Here he argued that 
the practitioners of different sciences make use of different senses of causation that 
reflect the distinctive nature of their explanandum. Historians are committed to what 
Collingwood refers to as sense I of the term ‘cause’. As Collingwood puts it, in 
history ‘that which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and 
responsible agent, and causing him to do it means affording him a motive for so 
doing.’23 The word is used in this (historical) sense in expressions such as ‘Mr 
Baldwin’s speech compelled the speaker to adjourn the house’ or ‘a solicitor’s letter 
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causes a man to pay his debt’. A historian’s commitment to sense I of the term 
causation reflects the view that to explain actions means to make rational sense of 
them. Collingwood then considers the sense of causation employed in what he calls 
the practical sciences of nature, sciences such as medicine and engineering. In the 
practical sciences of nature the term cause is used in sense II to mean an antecedent 
condition that can be manipulated either to prevent or bring about a certain state of 
affairs. In sense II ‘a cause is an event or state of things by producing or preventing 
which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be’.24 Thus, for a 
medical practitioner the bite of a mosquito would qualify as a possible cause (in sense 
II) of malaria, for the primary concern of the medical doctor is to prevent or cure 
diseases. Finally, the term cause may also be used (in sense III) in the theoretical 
sciences of nature to mean an ‘event or state of things such that (a) if the cause 
happens or exists, the effect must happen or exist even if no further conditions are 
fulfilled (b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens or exists.’25 
Sciences such physics, which abstract from human interests, employ the term ‘cause’ 
in this deterministic sense to indicate factors that are beyond human control. The 
different senses of causation at work in different explanatory practices are analytic for 
the practitioners of those practices because they spell out what it means to explain 
something as a particular of a certain kind, be it an action or an event. 
It is precisely the attempt to defend the possibility of different senses of 
causation that leads Collingwood to take issue with the verificationist principle of 
meaning as defended in Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. The verificationist 
principle, very much like Ryle’s earlier condemnation of philosophical propositions 
as ‘systematically misleading’, threatens Collingwood’s conception of philosophical 
analysis as a second-order enquiry which seeks to make explicit purely intensional 
distinctions, such as those holding between the different senses of causation that 
govern different explanatory practices. According to Ayer’s verificationist principle 
propositions which are not empirically verifiable are meaningless (unless they are 
tautologies). The verificationist principle of meaning threatens the view that there are 
purely intensional distinctions between the different senses of causation that govern 
the explanatory practices of different sciences because the ‘propositions’ which 
unpack the conception of explanation at work in a given form of enquiry, propositions 
                                                 
24
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such as ‘a cause is an event by producing or preventing which we can produce or 
prevent that whose effect it is said to be’ are neither empirically verifiable nor are 
they tautologies.  
An Essay on Metaphysics is Collingwood’s second stab at the argument, 
already developed in An Essay on Philosophical Method, that philosophy has an 
autonomous domain of enquiry and that its distinctive subject matter are the 
categories or concepts which are presupposed by first-order scientists. Collingwood’s 
line of defence against Ayer is that the ‘propositions’ which explicate the different 
conceptions of causation at work in different explanatory practices are not 
propositions in Ayer’s sense, i.e. first-order empirical propositions.26 They are 
propositions of a higher order which express interesting (non-trivial) conceptual truths 
and supply the verification conditions at work in different explanatory contexts.  
Collingwood refers to these higher order propositions which express the meaning of 
causation at work in different explanatory contexts as absolute presuppositions and 
contrasts them to presuppositions that are merely relative. A presupposition is relative 
if it may be discarded without endangering the explanatory practice within which it is 
formulated. For example, the presupposition that ‘the cause of malaria is the bite of a 
mosquito’ is verifiable relative to the criterion of verifiability provided by sense II of 
causation and may be discarded without threatening the practice of medicine. A 
presupposition, by contrast, is absolute if it cannot be discarded without giving up the 
explanatory practice which it grounds. Thus, whilst doctors may incorrectly and yet 
consistently deny that there is a causal relation between smoking and lung cancer, 
they cannot consistently deny that ‘the cause of an event is an antecedent condition by 
producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose effect it is said 
to be’ without giving up on medicine as a possible scientific enquiry. That ‘the cause 
of an event is an antecedent condition by producing or preventing which we can 
produce or prevent that whose effect it is said to be’ is analytic for medical 
practitioners.  
The different senses of causation at work in the Geisteswissenschaften and the 
Naturwissenschaften commit their practitioners to the existence of different categories 
of things. For historians actions exist because historians explain what there is as an 
expression of thought. For natural scientists events exist because they explain what 
                                                 
26
 In An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood uses the term “proposition” as short hand for 
“empirical proposition”. 
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occurs as an expression of causal laws. The vocabulary that Collingwood uses is 
markedly different from the one employed in An Essay on Philosophical Method, but 
the substance of what he says is the same: Actions and Events are categories not of 
revisionary, but of descriptive metaphysics that exist for the practitioners of the 
Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften respectively, very much as Mind and 
Matter are meta-level concepts which exist for historians and natural scientists. The 
job of the philosopher is to distinguish these different categories by disentangling the 
different conceptions of causation that are absolutely presupposed in different 
explanatory contexts. Once again, Collingwood links the defence of a distinctive 
subject matter for philosophical analysis to his defence of intensional notions and our 
right to employ them beyond the context of merely tautological or narrowly analytical 
claims. 
But, nota bene, to say that absolute presuppositions are non-empirical 
propositions which express interesting conceptual truths is not the same as saying that 
to deny, e.g. that ‘there are actions’ is to utter a contradiction in the way in which 
classical rationalist metaphysicians believed that to deny ‘God exists’ involves a 
contradiction. The contradiction arises only for the practitioner (historians, or natural 
scientists) who presupposes a certain conception of causation. There is no 
contradiction in claiming that ‘there are no actions’ as long as one does not seek to 
engage in the kind of explanatory practice which presupposes the intelligibility of the 
world of human action. The predicament in which the practitioners of a science find 
themselves is thus not dissimilar to the logician’s predicament as described by Lewis 
Carroll in ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’27. Carroll argued that the logician’s 
ability to endorse the conclusion of any given deductive argument relies on the prior 
acceptance of a principle of valid inference which is implicitly appealed to when one 
infers from the premises to the conclusions and without which the inference would 
lack validity. Like the logician in Carroll’s paper, first-order scientists are necessarily 
committed to principles of inference which determine the nature of their explanandum 
and which they are not at freedom to deny without changing the subject.
28
 
Collingwood’s criticism of Ayer, like his earlier criticism of Ryle, is that there are 
propositions which are true in virtue of meaning, and thus analytic in the broad sense, 
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 Carroll, L., ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’, Mind 4/1 (1895), pp. 278-280. 
28
 For a discussion of Carroll see Hanna, R., Rationality and Logic (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006), chapter 3. 
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but which are not tautologous or analytic in the narrower sense accepted by logical 
positivism. So understood, Collingwood’s claim that one should turn metaphysics into 
a study of absolute presuppositions implies not that metaphysics is an enquiry into 
what the practitioners of a science believe, but that absolute presuppositions express 
conceptual truths which cannot be discarded without overthrowing the very form of 
enquiry which they make possible.  
The view that absolute presuppositions express interesting conceptual truths 
has substantive implications for the ways in which one understands the nature of 
Collingwood’s intervention in the history of twentieth century philosophy. It is 
conventional wisdom to read Collingwood’s An Essay on Metaphysics as advocating 
the dissolution of metaphysics into history by transforming metaphysics from an 
ontological enquiry concerning the ultimate structure of reality into a historical 
investigation concerning the beliefs that different people held in different periods of 
time.
29
 On this reading, Collingwood was not only trying to sever the link between 
metaphysics and ontology, he was also rejecting the view that there are propositions 
which are true in virtue of meaning alone. If, as the standard reading goes, 
metaphysics is an historical enquiry into the absolute presuppositions that people 
make at a certain time, then these presuppositions are true only for certain people at a 
certain time and are thus, in the last analysis, only more general propositions about 
matters of fact which do not differ in kind from first order propositions or what 
Collingwood called ‘relative’ presuppositions. 
Wittingly or unwittingly the standard reading of Collingwood ascribes to him 
a conception of philosophy that is not incompatible with the naturalistic trend and the 
progressive attack on the a priori that is sometimes identified with the narrative of the 
rise of analytic philosophy. For if there is no distinction in kind between philosophy 
and history, then there is no principled distinction between the domain of enquiry of 
philosophy and that of the first-order sciences, and Collingwood could not be seen as 
                                                 
29
 The view that the later Collingwood converted to historicism was first put forward by 
Malcom Knox in his introduction to the posthumously published The Idea of History and has 
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defending a view of philosophy as an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method 
and subject matter. His historicism would be a thinly disguised form of naturalism. 
On the reading presented in this paper, Collingwood’s work is best understood 
as resisting the philosophical trend which is often identified with the rise of analytic 
philosophy: the gradual erosion and ultimate elimination of the a priori and the 
related notion of analyticity. Whilst Collingwood did share with the newly emerging 
analytical tradition a critique of metaphysics understood as an ontological enquiry 
into the ultimate structure of reality, his criticism of metaphysics was not motivated 
by a desire to debunk either the epistemological distinction between empirical and a 
priori propositions or the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions. On the contrary, his work is best read as a sustained attempt to defend 
intensional notions against the neo-empiricist agenda which came to dominate 
analytical philosophy in its early stages. 
 
Conclusion 
The Collingwood-Ryle exchange offers an interesting window onto the origins of 
analytic philosophy. It is interesting because Ryle misunderstands Collingwood’s 
notion of philosophical propositions and because it shows that this misunderstanding, 
far from being superficial, springs from a commitment to an extensionalist account of 
concepts that ultimately makes it impossible to conceive of a leaner, non-
metaphysical notion of synthetic a priori judgments as expressing conceptual claims 
which define the domain of enquiry of first order disciplines and which are analytic 
for first order investigators. Ryle takes Collingwood’s defence of the synthetic a 
priori to amount to a defence of traditional metaphysics, but the fact that Ryle’s 
criticism of Collingwood is based on a misunderstanding does not entail they agree on 
the way forward for philosophy. What emerges from the correspondence is that the 
disagreement between Ryle and Collingwood is fundamentally a disagreement about 
the role and character of philosophical analysis. Collingwood viewed the role of 
philosophical analysis as that of conceptually disentangling concepts that coincide in 
their instances, and thus ascribed an important role to philosophy in clarifying the 
domains of enquiry of different sciences. Ryle failed to grasp the precise nature of 
Collingwood’s defence of the autonomy of philosophy, not only because he was 
unwilling to rehabilitate old-fashioned metaphysics (the ontological proof was, as I 
have tried to show, just a smokescreen for the real issues), but because he was 
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committed to an extensionalist account of concepts that barred him from 
acknowledging the possibility of purely intensional distinctions between the domain 
of enquiries of different sciences. 
An Essay on Metaphysics revisited the same themes of An Essay on 
Philosophical Method and sought to articulate a defence of the autonomy of 
philosophy in a language that would have been familiar to the readers of Ayer’s 
Language Truth and Logic. But it has been widely misunderstood as providing an 
argument for the dissolution of philosophy into history. On the conventional reading 
of An Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood sought to dissolve metaphysics into history 
by transforming it from an enquiry into what there is or exists into an enquiry into 
what different groups of people have believed in different moments of time. 
Metaphysics is effectively replaced by group psychology or cultural anthropology. As 
a result, whilst Collingwood’s first meta-philosophical treatise has been attacked for 
harking back to a pre-Humean notion of metaphysics, his second meta-philosophical 
treatise has been erroneously accused of being insufficiently philosophical. As I have 
tried to argue, Collingwood was seeking neither to rehabilitate classical rationalist 
metaphysics, as the early Ryle argued, nor to turn philosophy into cultural 
anthropology, as the standard reading of An Essay on Metaphysics claims. In both 
cases he was seeking to delineate a distinctive domain of enquiry for philosophy by 
carving out a via media between the old metaphysics and new empiricism. This 
approach involved challenging the narrow conception of analyticity admitted by Ayer 
and defending the possibility of interesting conceptual truths. Unfortunately, 
Collingwood’s defence of the autonomy of philosophy was caught between the 
proponents of two powerful historical trends, one in decline, the other in the ascent. 
Squeezed, both logically and historically speaking, between two currents that allowed 
for no third way, his defence of the autonomy of philosophy was hardly understood. 
As a result, An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on Metaphysics have 
failed to be recognised for what they arguably are: the two most sustained attempts to 
carve out a distinctive domain of enquiry for philosophical analysis and to defend the 
autonomy of philosophy in the twentieth century. 
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